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PROFIT-SHARING AS A METHOD OF COMPENSATION

A little group consisting of Mr. H. S. Dennison, Mr. Burritt,
Mr. Kendall and Mr. Gay, then dean of the Harvard Graduate
School of Business, and myself some time ago formed a conclusion
that the subject of profit-sharing, viewed as a method of industrial
compensation, was a subject which justifies a careful, impartial
investigation and examination in the light of present day business
practice and business methods. So we set out to conduct that in
vestigation. The investigation extended somewhat over a period
of two years and involved an investigation, so far as we know, of
the most of the important profit-sharing plants and plans in the
United States.
I am going to try to summarize, very briefly, the general re
sult of that investigation and the conclusions at which we arrived
jointly.
At the outset let us ask the question: What is profit-sharing,
anyway? So much publicity has been given to these various so3

called profit-sharing plans and so many things are widely heralded
and advertised as being profit-sharing which do not constitute
profit-sharing in any real sense of the term, that we are justified in
asking the question: What really is a profit-sharing plan?
We shall omit from consideration all bonus and charitable
plans which masquerade under the guise of profit-sharing, and con
fine our discussion exclusively to those plans which deserve the
term. What is profit-sharing? You will agree with me that profitsharing viewed not as a method of social reform, but purely as a
business proposition, refers to an agreement, contract or arrange
ment between an employing firm or corporation on the one hand
and its employees (or certain of them) on the other, in accordance
with which that firm contracts or obligates itself to share or per
mit its employees (or certain of them) to participate in the profits
either of that business as a whole or in the profits of some depart
ment or unit of that business. But the participation must be upon
a pre-determined, pre-arranged and definitely known basis. Other
wise we are dealing not with a system of industrial compensation
but with some system of social reform.
Viewing profit-sharing as an agreement under which a pre
determined and pre-arranged participation or distribution of profits
is permitted, there are three general types of such plans: (1) Gen
eral profit-sharing, in accordance with which employees are per
mitted to participate in general or on a pre-determined ratio in
the profits of the business as a whole; (2) unit or departmental
profit-sharing in which employees are permitted to share the profit
yielded by a certain unit or department; and (3) individual profitsharing. Such a firm as Sprague-Warner, for example, enters into
an individual profit-sharing contract with its traveling salesmen,
that they shall receive a percentage of all the net profit yielded on
their business or arising from their territory.
Why should any firm or corporation contemplate the intro
duction of profit-sharing, keeping in mind that we are considering
it purely as a method of compensation, as a business device? No
firm or corporation will introduce the system unless it justifies it
self by increased profits, unless in operation the plan in the long
run will prove mutually profitable to the corporation and to those
who participate in the plan. After all, employers have found that
it is wiser to keep their charity and business entirely separate and
distinct from each other. And the typical employee, likewise, does
not seek charity at the hands of his employer. Therefore, if the
plan cannot be justified purely as a business arrangement, it can
not be justified at all. So what purposes are there which may lead
a firm or a corporation to decide to embark upon a profit-sharing
program from the standpoint of business efficiency? I want to
call your attention to certain guiding or controlling purposes in
the minds of certain employers, firms and corporations, which
under certain special and peculiar circumstances have led them to
the introduction of profit-sharing as a method of industrial compen
sation.
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The first group of circumstances, under which profit-sharing
has been frequently introduced, is for the purpose of increasing
personal efficiency, the theory being that if the employees are given
a stake in the business or a participation in the profits, there will
be created an incentive for increased efficiency and effort, more
speed and more output, which in the long run will pay for the
plan. Is it true? Will profit-sharing achieve that result and is
the introduction of profit-sharing to be recommended on the ground
that it will provide a stimulus, an incentive, to men to do more
work, to accomplish more results than otherwise would be the
case? In my judgment, no, except under certain special circum
stances. In other words, I do not believe profit-sharing as an in
centive to increase personal effort is to be recommended in any case
where it is possible to find any direct yard-stick for individual
results. If it is possible to measure the individual results by a
system of piece rate, by commission on sales, or by a bonus, such
a system is preferable to general profit-sharing, because it is more
closely tied up to the individual effort and the individual results.
But we are confronted with the fact that there is a great deal
of work in the industrial world with regard to which it is impossi
ble to find any simple yard-stick by which you can measure the
individual results, and, therefore, employees must be paid a flat
hourly or day wage. Very frequently individuals are working in
teams or groups, or the work is of such a character that the out
put is a joint product, and it is as impossible to measure one man’s
contribution, to segregate or distinguish that part of the product
which should be definitely attributed to his effort as it is to un
scramble an egg. In cases of that kind the customary method is
to pay men a flat hourly or time rate, and certain firms have found
it desirable to supplement the flat time rate with profit-sharing,
on the ground that it would at least provide some incentive for
increased effort and output. Examples of this type are the Proc
tor and Gamble plan, which applies to men on work most of which
cannot be individually measured, and the plan of the Boston Con
solidated Gas Company, which applies to a large group of men,
excavators, repair men and others engaged in miscellaneous work
where it has proven impossible to find any uniform yard-stick to
apply to their efforts. On the whole it may be said, viewed simply
as a stimulus to increasing effort in the rank and file, if you can
find any arrangement which will relate itself and tie itself up more
closely with the measurable output or result of the individual, such
an arrangement is vastly preferable to profit-sharing.
But we must face the fact that much of the work in the in
dustrial world is not of that character; and frequently, supple
menting the flat time wage with the addition of profit-sharing has
served to provide some incentive over and above what would pre
vail on the flat time rate.
A second group of special circumstances, which sometimes
lead to the introduction of profit-sharing, is for the purpose of
preventing waste. In certain types of employment and certain
5

industries, very valuable materials pass through employees’ hands.
Any carelessness or negligence on their part, or any increased
effort or care, will be reflected in the amount of waste and loss
which is incurred. I am thinking of one company, a large textile
organization, which found that for years its loss sustained in the
dye house was almost beyond belief, due to the fact that there was
negligence and carelessness upon the part of the employees to
whom was entrusted that important responsibility. The com
pany found that there was no way to measure the individual loss
or waste for which the individual workman was responsible. With
the introduction of profit-sharing plans, the employees had a feel
ing of responsibility in the financial success of the business and
an incentive to greater care and economy than before. Very
material and substantial reductions in the losses which previously
took place in that department of the business resulted.
Sometimes you will find that under special circumstances,
profit-sharing has been introduced to serve two purposes; (1) to
secure additional personal effort, and (2) to bring about reduc
tion in loss and waste. I am thinking of the A. W. Burritt Com
pany, Bridgeport, Connecticut, which employs a novel and unique
plan, known as the profit and loss sharing plan, in accordance with
which the employees are permitted to share in the profit, but they
also obligate themselves to share in the losses of the company.
Each employee permits the company to retain a percent of his
wages weekly for the accumulation of a fund over the fifty-two
weeks of the year from which his share of the loss is to be charged
at the end of the year in case any losses are sustained. That
feature is unusual. Ordinary profit-sharing does not carry with
it the obligation to participate in loss, if there is any.
There is another special circumstance, or group of conditions,
that arises in many employments which have led to the introduc
tion of profit-sharing as a system of compensation, namely, when
men are engaged in work in which close, personal supervision is
rendered impossible, due to the scattered or the dispersed location
of the work. Not all the work in the industrial world is done under
one roof or in one factory. If it were, supervision by foremen and
others would be simple. But much work is done by men who are
sent out from the central headquarters, here and there, and every
where. Therefore, it is impossible to maintain that degree of
close personal contact, supervision, and direction which would be
the case under more immediate control. In certain cases where
men must be sent out to work alone, where it is difficult or im
possible to supervise them, profit-sharing has been successfully
introduced as a substitute to provide them with an incentive to
stay on the job and accomplish the best of which they are capable.
Maison LeClair in Paris, in which profit-sharing has been in
successful operation for over one hundred years, is the world’s
greatest example of this kind of a business. It is a great decorat
ing business. Those who are employed in it are engaged in fresco
ing, interior decoration, exterior decoration and painting, and
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they have built up the largest business of its kind in France, with
over a hundred men, sometimes over a thousand employed, on work
in various parts of the country. In that type of work it is peculi
arly difficult to maintain close personal supervision, and in the
case of Maison LeClair it has been found, during somewhat over
a hundred years, that a carefully administered plan for profitsharing applied to a carefully selected group of men has provided
that incentive. I know of one or two large building organizations,
having a large number of jobs in progress where the same plan is
applied. And you may be interested to know that in one or two of
the largest dairy, milk and ice companies in this country, employ
ing a large number of drivers, each one of whom has his own route
and each one working as a separate unit himself, the drivers are
compensated on the basis of the profits of their respective routes.
The theory of participation in the profits by men engaged on work
that cannot be definitely measured is that the privilege of partici
pating in some fixed ratio, either in the profits of some unit of the
business or of the entire business, will provide an incentive to
effort.
Then, again, many firms have introduced profit-sharing with
the thought in mind that in this way they would undoubtedly stabalize their labor supply. In other words, it might prove an effective
device which would more than pay for itself in reducing the labor
turnover, in promoting permanency and stability on the part of
the employed staff, and in encouraging employees to stay by the
hope of participation in the profits, thus eliminating the waste that
is involved in hiring and firing men over and over again. In this
way the plan may pay for itself. Whether profit-sharing will prove
an effective incentive to men to stay on the job rather than to seek
new jobs elsewhere, depends upon whether or not profit-sharing
is used as a device or subterfuge to nibble off their wages and pay
them less than would otherwise be the case. I regret to say that
in many cases profit-sharing has been used in precisely that way,
and, of course, in such cases it will not succeed in accomplishing
any other worth-while results; but if a scheme of profit-sharing is
introduced upon the assumption that men will be paid the full
going market rate of wages, and that, as a reward for permanency
or length of service, they may be permitted to participate is some
thing over the full, current market rate of wages, it may be suc
cessful in producing such results.
Recently the United States Department of Labor conducted
an investigation of all the important profit-sharing schemes in oper
ation in the country, and while there was a great divergence of
opinion among the employers and corporations as to whether or
not profit-sharing makes men more efficient day by day, whether
it actually increased the output, there was one point with which
there was practical unanimity among the employers and that was
that it did very materially promote length, permanence, and stabil
ity of service.
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Of course, there are various types of plans. Many of these
provide a graduated scale, that is, employees are permitted to
participate in the profits in accordance with a progressive scale
in direct ratio to years of service. In Sears-Roebuck they are not
permitted to participate until they have served a long period of
years—I think it is seven years. Suffice it to say, that profit-shar
ing, if it represents something over and above the full going current
rate of wages, will probably succeed in promoting permanency
of service. If it does not represent this, it will have very little
effect in reducing the labor turn-over and promoting permanency
and stability of service.
In my judgment the most important business purpose leading
to the introduction of profit-sharing and its most important justi
fication is that of promoting efficient management, among man
agerial executives, minor executives and supervisory employees.
The curious thing is, that all the public discussion, which has been
had, all the literature, articles and books which have been written
on this subject deal with profit-sharing as a method of compensa
tion for the rank and file of the wage earning group, whereas, as
a matter of fact, the most profitable and promising field for the
application of profit-sharing is among those who occupy man
agerial or minor executive positions and responsibilities of this
character. Best results are obtained when it is introduced among
employees, not at the bottom, but rather at the top and in the inter
mediate positions, for the purpose of stimulating more efficient
management and for the purpose of providing an incentive to
these employees to the fullest exercise of whatever capacity or
ability nature has implanted within them. The major portion of
the men occupying such positions are paid on a flat salary basis.
True, it may be increased at the end of the year, but, nevertheless,
it is a contractual arrangement which rests directly upon a flat
salary—so much, no more and no less—unless, of course, it is
advanced. The fact is that the flat salary as a system of compen
sation for executives and managerial employees has precisely the
same weakness that the flat hourly rate has for men in the rank
and file of the wage-earning group when they are so employed. A
flat salary does not tend to put a man on his toes; it does not tend
to pull out of a man the very most that is in him. True, there may
be the incentive of a hope of increase, and up to a certain point that
does provide an incentive, but when the increase does not come or
is not as large as the individual thinks it ought to be, when the
increases are not as frequent as he would like to have them, or
when he reaches the salary limit for that particular kind of a job,
then there developes a certain lassitude, a certain “resting on the
oars,” a certain slowing down of the gait, very frequently a cer
tain, although unconscious and ill-defined, lurking resentment,
which very materially interferes with the individual achieving as
much as he might achieve if he had only something which would
put him on his toes and pull out the full exercise of everything that
is in him. That is where profit-sharing provides an energizing
8

influence and an incentive to this group of executives, minor ex
ecutives and supervisory employees, on whose shoulders rests in
a very large measure the success of any business enterprise. Recog
nizing the difficulties of a flat salary as a method of compensation
for employees occupying important positions of this character, a
very large number of firms and corporations have in recent years,
quietly, unnoticed and unobserved, introduced profit-sharing, not
for the rank and file, not for all their wage earners, but applied
simply to certain selected groups in their own organization. To a
great extent this form of profit-sharing is in operation today. It
is not the kind of profit-sharing which is written up, which gets
publicity or which appeals to the sentiments or altruistic instincts.
But recognizing the difficulty of the flat salary form of compensa
tion, and, yet, recognizing the fact that for many of those occupy
ing such executive positions there is no yard-stick by which their
contribution to the business can be measured, many firms have
been introducing profit-sharing applied to the managerial group.
In the retailing of merchandise, you will find that a goodly num
ber of large department stores throughout the country have intro
duced profit-sharing of the departmental or unit type, in accordance
with which the department head or buyer or whatever he may be
called, is paid in addition to his salary, not a commission on his
sales, but a percentage upon the profits yielded by his unit or by
his department of the business. That is done in the Wanamaker
stores and a good many others of that type. In large department
stores the individual department manager or buyer, therefore,
actually is participating in the profits, not of the entire business,
but of that unit of the business for which he is responsible. The
Woolworth stores, the Kresge stores and most of the other chain
stores have introduced this principle either in its entirety or in
modified form. You will find that many branch store managers
in our great chain systems today receive their compensation di
rectly in the form of a percent of the profits, not of the entire
corporation, but of the profits of the store of which they are in
charge or of the merchandising operations for which they are
responsible. Profit-sharing when applied to the merchandising
operations of the managerial group, for those who are responsible
for the formulating of the policy of merchandising success, has
proven highly effective in promoting the best results of which these
men are capable, because the profits of any unit or department are
the only possible yard-sticks which reflect or which measure all of
the responsibilities with which they are charged. These men—
particularly is this true with regard to department managers in
retail or department stores—are responsible for the buying, for
the selection of the merchandise, for determining the mark-up and
price, for the selection of sales people and employees, for their
supervision and discharge and for the sales of their department.
They are, in a sense, small individual merchants, and, therefore,
to pay them a percent of the sales would in no sense measure their
efficiency with regard to the discharge of these other functions.
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But paying them a percent of the profit reflects their efficiency in
the discharge of all these numerous and diverse functions with
which they are charged.
The same principle is being recognized today in the manu
facturing field. Especially during the last five years a large num
ber of manufacturing concerns have introduced profit-sharing as
applied to a certain selected group. In many cases, they take all
who are receiving a salary of more than a certain amount. I do
not think that is a very satisfactory method. It is in operation with
the Dennison company. All who receive in excess of $2,500 a year
are permitted to share in the profits. The American Rolling Mills
Company begins at $2,000. The Studebaker Corporation has a
very carefully worked out profit-sharing plan which applies only
to its executive and upper group of employees. All the members
of its staff occupying positions of sufficient importance are classi
fied into four groups, depending on the responsibility of the posi
tions which they occupy; and their participation in the profits, in
turn, depends upon the group to which they are classified or as
signed. The Studebaker Company says its plan includes “all those
employees whose responsibilities include the spending of the com
pany’s money, handling its property, making commitments for its
account, or the employment and the supervision of its employees.”
The Wayne Knitting Company, and a large list of other companies,
whose businesses are limited chiefly to manufacturing have intro
duced a profit-sharing plan, but have confined its application to
those occupying positions of managerial importance.
Another very important reason why profit-sharing has been
introduced in the manufacturing field, particularly among man
agerial employees, is for the purpose of promoting co-operation
among those occupying the executive positions of major importance
in the manufacturing business. Now, co-operation sounds like
something altruistic, indistinct and indefinite, but it is something
very real. It makes the difference between a successful and an un
successful business. You know that in an organization where the
various department heads and those occupying the positions of
major importance do not pull together, but are always pulling
apart, where each man is always endeavoring to pass the buck to
others, and causing other department heads to make an unfavor
able showing, the business cannot permanently succeed. But the
business, particularly the manufacturing business, where the vari
ous department heads and executives and minor executives, are
pulling together, characterized by a spirit of team-work, a real
esprit d’ corps, trying not to put each other in an unfavorable
light, but trying to promote the business as a whole, is built on a
much more permanent and successful foundation. Co-operation
is certainly necessary in the manufacturing business between the
cost and the production departments, the credit department, and
the sales department. That is another reason why profit-sharing,
which would provide these men who are responsible for the con
duct of the various departments with an incentive, with an in10

ducement, with a stake to pull together to promote the interest of
the business as a whole, to reduce its cost, to stop its leaks, and to
enlarge its sales and to promote its long-run interest, has proven
effective.
I know that you will be interested in this general statement:
Where managerial profit-sharing has been introduced in mer
chandising—in large retail stores, department stores and chain
stores—you will always find that it is unit or departmental profitsharing, but where it is introduced in a manufacturing business,
you will always find it is the general profit-sharing. In other
words, in the merchandising business, if the executive or depart
ment heads are permitted to share, ordinarily, they share only in
the profits yielded by their departments or units, but in the man
ufacturing business and all others, so far as I know, the executives
participate in the profits of the business as a whole. In these
chain stores, department stores, retail and merchandising estab
lishments, the various departments can be treated as separate
profit producing units. Each of them is in a sense a separate
store, each can be charged with its own expense and credited with
its own profits. But in a manufacturing business, which is en
gaged in making some one standard article, and where the various
production departments in the business are simply engaged in
putting the raw material through the various stages of manu
facture and production until it emerges as a finished product, it is
not possible under any system of accounting, so far as I know, to
treat these separate departments as separate profit producing
units. Therefore, you will find in the manufacturing business,
that managerial profit-sharing is general, whereas, in a mer
chandising business, managerial profit-sharing is departmental or
unit profit-sharing.
I am going to summarize this whole discussion by trying to
state as simply as I can the conclusion at which our group of five
arrived. Each of the five approached this from a somewhat dif
ferent point of view. We had somewhat different preconceived
ideas with regard to the scope and applicability of profit-sharing,
but as a result of our inquiry we all agreed unanimously upon
this conclusion: that eliminating all social and altruistic considera
tions, and viewing profit-sharing simply as a business arrange
ment, a method of compensation which must justify itself, and
which must pay its own way, profit-sharing is most effective only
with certain groups, namely, with high groups and with small
groups. Let me re-state that in a somewhat more accurate man
ner: Viewing profit-sharing purely as an efficiency device, its
effectiveness is in direct ratio to the rank of the participants, and
it is in inverse ratio to the size or the number of the participating
group. Let us analyze that statement just a moment. We say
that the effectiveness of profit-sharing as an incentive, as a motive,
as a stimulus for men, is in direct ratio to the responsibility, to
the character of the job the man occupies. The higher the job,
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and the greater the responsibility, the more effective profit-sharing
will be.
In the first place, it is perfectly evident that in the case of men
who are occupying positions of this character, their opportunity
to exercise an important influence is very much greater than is
that of the man who holds a job in the rank and file. The pur
chasing agent, by one shrewd purchase in the front office, in half
an hour can exercise a more important influence on the year’s
total production than can a mechanic out in the shop in a year,
regardless of how faithful and efficient he may be in the perform
ance of his duties. In other words, the men who occupy the more
important positions exercise a more important influence upon profit,
and, therefore, it follows, that if you can get any additional incen
tive for them, it will be more profitable to do so. In the second
place, those who occupy the more important responsibilities can
see the relationship between their effort and profit very much
more easily than the obscure employee down in the rank and file.
It is a perfectly easy thing for the salesmanager to see that if he
can put on a new type of selling campaign successfully, or for the
export manager to see that if he can find a new foreign market for
the product, there will be a tremendous influence exercised on the
year’s profits. But it is a very difficult thing to make the elevator
operator or janitor understand that by any increased care on his
part he will exercise any tremendously large influence on the year’s
profit, because the fact is he will not and he cannot.
Then, again, for those who occupy these more important posi
tions, profit-sharing is likely to prove much more successful, be
cause they are much more familiar with business vicissitudes,
fluctuations and uncertainties than are the employees down in the
rank and file. That is a tremendously important consideration, be
cause if you have a profit-sharing scheme which includes all the
rank and file, your plan may go along beautifully so long as you
are earning good profits, but just as soon as the company strikes
a lean year and the profits available for distribution are small or
non-existent, antagonism and suspicion are aroused. “Why, we
worked just as hard this year as last. Where are the profits?”
Whereas, in the case of managerial employees, if the company
strikes a lean year, instead of undermining their confidence in the
plan, it only quickens and deepens their sense of partnership and
confederation, because they are familiar with the conditions which
have brought about that unfortunate result. Many profit-sharing
schemes for the rank and file have worked successfully for a few
years, and then have had to be abandoned because the employees’
suspicion and antagonism were aroused when the company struck
a bad year.
But more important than any of these considerations is the
fact that in the case of men occupying the upper positions of more
importance, it is more difficult, generally speaking, to find any
yard-stick by which you can measure their individual results.
How will you find a system for these men occupying the more
12

important positions by which you can definitely distinguish the
contribution which that individual has made to the success of the
business, or pay him a bonus accordingly ? It can be done in some
cases. The sales manager may be paid a bonus upon sales, but
what yard-stick would you find, for example, for the controller,
the auditor, the chief cost accountant, the employment manager,
the man in charge of public relations, the publicity man, the ad
vertising department? It simply cannot be done, and in the ab
sence of any such individual yard-stick, and as a supplement to
strengthen and reinforce the flat salary arrangement, profit-shar
ing frequently proves highly effective in motivating and ener
gizing this group upon whose effort so largely depends the success
of the business. It is for these reasons that I say profit-sharing
is in direct ratio to the rank of the participants.
I should not be misunderstood as saying that profit-sharing
will never work with a large group of employees. It may. It is
in operation in some such establishments, but I do maintain that
if it is to be applied to the rank and file of wage-earners, it will
work very much better in a comparatively small business estab
lishment than it will in a large establishment where thousands of
such employees of the rank and file are permitted to participate.
Why? What is the ratio of the effectiveness of profit-sharing as
a method for compensation on the size of the participating group ?
It is this. The greater the number, the larger the number of em
ployees who are to participate in the scheme or plan, the less is
the opportunity for the management to educate the employees
with regard to the essentials of profit-sharing. If you are going to
have a plan of profit-sharing for the rank and file of labor, it will
not prove self-operating. Nothing does. That means you must
have a constant and continuous campaign for education among all
these employees who participate in order to point out to them all
the time just how they can affect profits, just what they can do by
increased care or economy of exertion to help increase the com
pany’s profit for the year. The larger the number of your em
ployees the more difficult that is to do. The more it has to be dele
gated by the management to certain other employees and sub
ordinates, the less is the direct, immediate, personal contact be
tween the management of the business and the employees of the
rank and file, and, therefore, the less effective, ordinarily, are the
efforts to enthuse the group with regard to profit-sharing.
This also is true. The larger the number of the rank and file
of employees who are participating (other things being equal),
the less is the influence which any one of them actually does exert
upon profits. If you have a thousand or ten thousand employees,
the influence that any one employee in one department can exercise
upon the year’s profits is relatively negligible. The larger the
business, even if he does exert himself, the greater is the possibility
that any increased care or saving, economy or efficiency on his part
will be off-set by the loafing on the job of someone else in some
other department in the business whom he has never seen or whom
13

he does not know. You cannot get the same degree of personal
enthusiasm out of a group of ten thousand wage-earning employees
with regard to a profit-sharing scheme that you can where there
are a hundred or two hundred. It is impossible to imagine that
in the Eastman Kodak Company, which has a profit-sharing plan
involving eight thousand employees, whatever its other merits
may be, it would be possible to get the same degree of education
and enthusiasm with regard to personal participation as is ob
tained in the A. W. Burritt Company, where about two hundred
employees of the rank and file participate.
Profit-sharing is in direct ratio to the rank; inverse ratio to
the size. I think that this conclusion, theoretical though it may
seem to be, is actually borne out and verified by the history of
profit-sharing experience, because so far as our investigation
carried us, we found, on analysis of the actual experience of Amer
ican firms and corporations dealing with profit-sharing plans, that
in practically all of those companies which had introduced profitsharing, had experimented with it and later had abandoned it,
the schemes were of the type which included the wage earners
alone, the rank and file alone, or which included a very large num
ber of the rank and file. We also found that out of those firms
which had experimented with profit-sharing among the managerial
and executive group, practically none had abandoned it. Many of
them have changed the plan, but practically all of them adhere to
the principle. On the other hand, many firms which had introduced
profit-sharing for all employees from the top down, had abandoned
profit-sharing as regards the rank and file, but still retained it for
the executive employees and those occupying the positions of man
agerial importance. So I think that experience verifies and bears
out the first conclusion.
We also found that where profit-sharing had been employed
for the rank and file of the employees and where it has had a suc
cessful operation over a goodly number of years—and there are
some such plants—practically all those plants are relatively small.
Some of the best known profit-sharing experiments, where profitsharing has been in operation for many years among the rank and
file, occur in small plants. The Burritt Company has 125 em
ployees, another has 110, another 175, and the Simplex Wire Com
pany—that is one of the experiments which is widely referred to
by President Elliott, in his advocacy of profit-sharing as being a
universal panacea—has eighty. Another plant frequently re
ferred to in messages of President Elliott, in which he regards
profit-sharing as the complete solution of our industrial problems,
employs 125 men; C. C. Meeker, 150; another 200; the Minneapolis
Bedding Company, 200; New Haven Gas Company, 100. So that
the general experience seems to be, not that profit-sharing will
never succeed with the rank and file, but that when introduced as
an incentive to greater effort, increased energy and larger output,
where it has proven successful for a long period of years the plant
has been a comparatively small one. Of course the plan may suc14

ceed for some of these other purposes, as for example with Proctor
and Gamble, where there are thousands of employees, and the
Boston Consolidated Gas Company, where it is introduced to pro
mote stability and permanency of labor supply.
Viewed purely as a method of industrial compensation, profitsharing has its place in the industrial scheme of things. It is
not a universal place; it is not to be recommended under any and
all circumstances. It simply takes its place side by side with a
good many other systems of industrial compensation, each one of
which is to be used under those circumstances which are most de
signed to secure its success. Profit-sharing has a very real place,
a place which in my judgment has been somewhat exaggerated
with regard to the rank and file and which has been largely over
looked and not sufficiently emphasized with respect to those em
ployees occupying the more important positions. Therefore, I am
convinced that profit-sharing, while it is not a universal panacea
for the solution of all those troublesome problems that arise by
virtue of the fact that one man must be employer and one em
ployed under our present economic system, has its place. I believe
that we are, therefore, destined to see in the future a wider and
certainly a much more careful and much more discriminating use
of profit-sharing as a system of industrial compensation than we
have seen in the past.
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